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Making Room for Representation
Seth Bullock
School of Computing, University of Leeds
One advantage that a dynamical systems perspective
on cognition as situated, embodied action (hereafter
abbreviated to “dynamical perspective”) is sometimes
claimed to have over a more traditional cognition-as-
computation approach is its ambivalence with respect
to the assumed nature of cognitive innards. Unlike a
traditional computationalist approach, a dynamical
perspective doesn’t automatically assume that a suc-
cessful explanation of the workings of any cognitive
mechanism will reveal how that mechanism relies on
the manipulation of quasi-linguistic representations.
But there are at least two different ways to under-
stand this kind of ambivalence. First, it might be under-
stood as a kind of eliminativism. Like a purely physical
explanation couched in terms of atomic collisions, a
dynamical systems account might simply under-cut
high-level cognitive phenomena, and perhaps as a
result have no room for notions of internal representa-
tion, etc. However, if this were the case, and it was
impossible to discover and characterize representa-
tional entities through a dynamical systems theory
approach, if they simply do not register from this per-
spective, then there would be little surprise when
dynamical approaches failed to generate representa-
tion-fuelled explanations. A dynamical systems expla-
nation would always be non-representational even
when applied to a traditional good-old-fashioned arti-
ficial-intelligence system.
However, the dynamical perspective’s ambiva-
lence could be of a second, non-eliminativist kind that
might be recast along these lines: while a dynamical
systems analysis of a cognitive system may lead to the
discovery that the mechanisms involved achieve their
success without recourse to anything resembling full-
blown conceptual representations, it is in principle pos-
sible that such an analysis might reveal the involve-
ment of an internal “language of thought’’ as imagined
by traditional cognitive science. In addition to this,
proponents of a dynamical perspective would presum-
ably make a second, separate, empirical claim that
much natural cognition can be fully explained in the
former, non-representational manner.
Beer’s (this issue) analysis of his circle-catching
agent provides a compelling demonstration of the
ability of the dynamical systems perspective to explain
the manner in which the coupling between brain, body
and world can be shaped to achieve simple discrimi-
natory behavior. Moreover, this explanation is com-
pleted without identifying a clear role for traditional
cognitive machinery—structure-sensitive processes
computing over compositional symbolic representa-
tions. However, the absence of anything resembling an
internal representation in the explanation of the
agent’s behavior, while perhaps strengthening the empir-
ical claim that cognition does not have to equal com-
putation, leaves open questions concerning the suita-
bility of the dynamical perspective for revealing the
nature of cognitive representations should they ever be
encountered. What would representations look like
from a dynamical perspective? How would they reveal
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themselves? Would “discovering’’ or “identifying’’
them require new kinds of dynamical systems tech-
nique or approach, or would the analysis presented by
Beer suffice? 
When considering the kinds of representational
phenomena that traditional computationalists might
expect to find within a cognitive system, Beer
describes the targets as internal agent states that “align
in some sufficiently straightforward way” with “objects
and relations appearing in our conceptualization of an
agent’s environment and behavior’’. It would appear
from this description that if representations are there
inside an agent’s head, then it will not be too hard to
find them. But there is no guarantee that real cognition
will meet these expectations. An agent’s internal rep-
resentations may align with objects and relations that
play an important role for the agent’s internal mecha-
nisms, but do not appear in our conceptualization of
its environment or behavior. Furthermore, this “align-
ment” could turn out to be far from straightforward. 
Beer also notes the wide middle-ground that stretches
between, at one extreme, non-representational internal
state that merely correlates with external states of
affairs, and, at the other, a traditional notion of repre-
sentation as symbolic, quasi-linguistic, centralized, com-
positional, etc. Beer appears to be slightly exasperated
by this profusion of representational kinds and to sus-
pect that this activity might simply disguise a funda-
mental weakness with the entire notion of internal
representation. However, if a dynamical systems per-
spective is truly neutral with respect to the nature of
cognitive innards, then it might be profitably used to
distinguish between this multitude of different notions
of representation and thereby settle some of these issues.
Just how useful are these representational notions in
understanding natural and artificial cognition?
The thought here is that if Beer’s explanatory
methodology is unbiased, it could (perhaps rarely)
reveal a representational explanation of some particu-
lar cognitive behavior. Examining the character of this
explanation could lend support to, or perhaps under-
mine, one or more of the different kinds of representa-
tional explanation listed by Beer. Rather than merely
taking the recent proliferation of different kinds of
representation theory to be the death rattle of represen-
tational explanation, the dynamical approach should
take seriously the prospect of new and better kinds of
representational story. In order for the dynamical
approach to do justice to the potential for representa-
tional explanation, much hinges on demonstrating that
these kinds of story fall within the ambit of dynamical
explanation both in principle and in practice. 
So, to summarize, when a dynamical systems anal-
ysis fails to uncover a role for representation in the
workings of a cognitive mechanism, it will be impor-
tant to understand whether this is because such a rep-
resentational account is hard (or perhaps impossible)
to formulate from a dynamical perspective, or because
the particular explanatory methods employed are per-
haps biased against such accounts, or alternatively,
because there is no need for such a representational
account, or such an account does not exist. The chal-
lenge for those adopting the dynamical perspective is
not simply to provide a representation-free account of
cognitive behavior, but to provide one that explains
why the behavior appears meaningful, why it is cogni-
tion rather than just motion. Whether or not one actu-
ally believes that much cognitive behavior relies on
the manipulation of internal quasi-linguistic represen-
tations, part of the challenge for any cognitive science
is to explain, rather than explain away, how cognition
comes to appear to be this way.
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